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ver the last fifteen years, a
diverse succession of disease-
related crises has befallen
farm animal and food industries in
the United Kingdom. Some have
involved animal health, with little risk
to humans. Some have involved
human health, with animals acting as
a reservoir for infection but little
affected themselves. Some, howev-
er—including the most alarming—
have involved both animal and human
health through zoonoses, diseases
transmittable from animal to human.
All of these crises are linked in the
public mind and in many commen-
taries, and indeed there are issues
that many of them share. The most
common of these is concern for food
safety, but concern for animal welfare
is also a recurrent theme. These con-
cerns play out against a backdrop of:
• Prevalent attitudes, including
complacency, about issues of bio-
security, from animal health to
food safety; 
• Relevant legislation, law enforce-
ment, and law breaking; 
• The practices of transporting ani-
mal feed, animals, and animal
products; and
• An emphasis on the economics of
animal production to the exclu-
sion of all other considerations.
Few of these crises have been limit-
ed to the United Kingdom, but the
problems do seem to have been worse
and more frequent there.
Salmonella 
in Eggs
In 1988 a government minister’s
statement that “most egg production
in the United Kingdom is infected by
salmonella” received wide publicity
(BBC 1999). The statement proved to
be true, and it was confirmed that sal-
monella bacteria from eggs cause food
poisoning. Egg sales fell by about half.
To some extent this was a “non-story,”
since salmonella had not recently
increased, the number of eggs affect-
ed was small, and the health risk for
consumers was relatively minor.
(Healthy adults are unlikely to suffer
more than a stomach upset even from
raw, infected eggs, although children
and old people may be more seriously
affected. Cooking infected eggs kills
the bacteria.) However, the scare
demonstrated clearly that public
expectations of food safety had
increased, and understandably so,
since an earlier time when occasional
food poisoning was routine. 
Fifteen years later, the food indus-
try is only beginning to grapple with
this heightened expectation. The
industry’s complacency has been
hard to shake off and, although per-
haps ill-founded, this could be justi-
fied at least partially by the fact that
the poultry sector has led other agri-
cultural sectors in health care for its
animals. Because of the susceptibility
of chickens and other poultry to dis-
ease, in the years following World War
II the industry developed a positive
approach to health control, including
farm design, hygiene, preventative
vaccination, and general manage-
ment (Julian 1995). Perhaps the
most important element of general
management has been the “all in, all
out” approach in which houses are
emptied completely between one
flock’s departure and the next’s
arrival. The ability to clean facilities
thoroughly between flocks and to
reduce transmission of disease vec-
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made a paramount contribution to
poultry health. It also underscores
the irony of the 1988 scare’s relation-
ship to poultry products rather than
to others more vulnerable. (The
approach is only now, many years
later, being adopted by other agricul-
tural sectors such as pig farming.)
Despite all this, the industry has
not eliminated salmonella in eggs, in
part, perhaps, because there are
many different types of bacteria
involved. The consequences for poul-
try are variable (Curtis 1990); mor-
tality ranges from 1 to 75 percent
(Sainsbury 2000) but is usually low.
By contrast, “a few areas of the world,
notably Scandinavia, have been able
to virtually rid themselves of salmo-
nella infections in animals” (113).
The furor in the United Kingdom
provoked an extensive response from
the government, including three
orders introduced in 1989. The
Zoonoses Order required registration
of flocks, regular testing for salmo-
nella, and stringent measures if it was
detected. The Processed Animal Pro-
tein Order and the Importation of
Processed Animal Protein Order
required salmonella testing of such
protein, intended for feeding ani-
mals—although it is notable that
these orders did not identify the sort
of problem that was even then exac-
erbating Bovine Spongiform En-
cephalopathy, or BSE (see the next
section). The promise of such mea-
sures, and their implementation,
reassured the public. Egg sales slowly
recovered. However, salmonella in
eggs still has not been eliminated in
the United Kingdom and in most of
the European Union (EU). Sainsbury
(2000, 116) suggests that even if it
were, this status would be difficult to
maintain. He comments as follows
about the lack of effective govern-
ment policy to reduce salmonellosis
and other zoonoses:
Our poultry. . . will always be vul-
nerable to the introduction and
re-infection from other sources,
such as wildlife, over which we
have no control, the whole envi-
ronment around them and above
all from man himself . . . . Also, ani-
mal products, including poultry,
enter the United Kingdom from
European Union sources in an
almost unrestricted way, and sev-
eral EU countries have no salmo-
nella control programmes. Poultry
products are currently entering
the United Kingdom from other
parts of the world where salmonel-
la control programmes are absent.
Thus, with people and animal
products constantly putting our
birds at risk, the United Kingdom
government’s policy is, at the
least, worrying.
By contrast, Pennington (BBC
1999)—professor of bacteriology at
the University of Aberdeen and well
known due to the E. coli inquiry (see
page 153)—suggests that salmonella
should not still be a problem:
I don't know why we have a prob-
lem with salmonella still, proba-
bly because we have not worked
hard enough to try to get rid of it.
We shouldn't have a problem with
salmonella. We know how to sort
it out. Other people have sorted it
out, we should have had it sorted
out long ago.
In 2001 the EU Commission
announced that it would target sal-
monella poisoning as a number one
priority in a food safety crackdown,
bringing in new controls affecting
producers of breeding poultry, laying
hens, broilers, turkeys, and pigs over
the next eight years (Meade 2001).
In the United States, about 40,000
cases of salmonellosis are reported
annually (more probably go unreport-
ed), and about 1,000 deaths (Marler
Clark, L.L.P., P.S. 2001). Evidence
that a significant number of these
cases derives from animal products is
circumstantial, but convincing, given
the extent of infection in poultry and
other units (Altekruse, Cohen, and
Swerdlow 1997):
The doubling of salmonellosis
incidence in the last two decades
has accompanied modern food
industries’ centralized production
and large-scale distribution.
. . . The trend toward larger mar-
kets and consolidation of industry
has exacerbated the Salmonella
enteritidis problem in another
way. Changes in egg production
have adversely affected infection
control in poultry flocks. In 1945,
a typical hen house contained
500 birds. By 1995, many houses
contained 100,000 hens, and
multiple houses were often linked
by common machinery, resulting
in large flocks with common risk
profiles. Large-scale distribution
of shell eggs from infected flocks
has caused outbreaks in which
contaminated eggs were distrib-





As its name indicates, BSE—a disease
discovered in 1986—causes the
brains of cattle to become spongy.
The resulting behavior, such as stag-
gering, has given rise to BSE’s com-
mon name, “mad cow disease.” After
1986 the incidence of BSE increased
gradually and then rapidly, peaking in
1992 at more than 3,000 cases per
month in the United Kingdom. Early
on, there was concern that BSE might
be transmittable to humans, and in
March 1996 it was confirmed that
such is probably the case. Eating
infected animal material is the likely
cause of a new variant of Creutzfeldt-
Jakob disease (vCJD), which has sim-
ilar physical symptoms in humans to
those of BSE in cattle. As of 2000
about 115 people had died from
vCJD, mostly in the United Kingdom,
according to an official inquiry set up
in 1997 and chaired by Lord Phillips
(Phillips, Bridgeman, and Ferguson-
Smith 2000). 
BSE must have become established
in U.K. cattle in the 1970s. Its origin
is not known, but a major possibility
is that it arose from a similar disease
in sheep called scrapie (Horn et al.
2001). Other sources suggested
include a mutation in a single cow,
zoo antelopes (Phillips, Bridgeman,
and Ferguson-Smith 2000), and U.S.
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cattle (H.W. Reid, Moredun Research
Institute, personal communication,
June 27, 2001). The latter idea stems
from the fact that U.S. mink have had
outbreaks of a similar disease since
the 1940s, of which beef is a likely
source (Phillips, Bridgeman, and Fer-
guson-Smith 2000). 
It quickly became clear that the
disease was spread by feeding cattle
meat and bone meal (MBM) from ani-
mal carcasses. The biological agent
that causes scrapie may have changed
to make it infective in cattle. Alterna-
tively or in addition, new manage-
ment practices introduced in the
1970s and 1980s probably increased
infectivity; these included changes in
how MBM was produced, and
increased feeding of MBM to young
calves (Horn et al. 2001). 
In 1988 the Ministry of Agriculture,
Fisheries, and Food (MAFF) intro-
duced a ban on feeding ruminant pro-
tein to ruminants. This was followed
in 1990 by a ban on using material
from cattle tissue most likely to be
infective (brain, spinal cord, and
intestines) for human food, and
another in 1991 on using such mate-
rial for feeding pigs and poultry.
Unfortunately, implementation of
these bans was made less effective by
two mistaken assumptions. First, it
was thought that the infection was
coming directly from sheep. In fact,
whatever its original source, the
infection now was being spread by
MBM from infected cattle being fed
to other cattle. This had a self-ampli-
fying effect that was not understood
for several more years: as more ani-
mals were infected, so the rate of
infection accelerated. The assump-
tion that scrapie was responsible also
inappropriately lessened the urgency
of measures to protect human health,
as scrapie is not transmittable to
humans. Second, it was thought that
infection was possible only if a large
amount of infective material was
eaten, whereas it proved that as little
as one gram was needed. Perhaps
because of this assumption, farmers
and feed suppliers were relaxed about
continuing, illegally, to use existing
stocks of MBM for their cattle and to
export MBM around the world. There
also was contamination of cattle feed
from that prepared for pigs and poul-
try (Phillips, Bridgeman, and Fergu-
son-Smith 2000). 
The result of the mistaken assump-
tions was that the disease became
much more widespread than it other-
wise might have. As of 2002 there had
been more than 180,000 cases of BSE
in the United Kingdom. In the rest of
Europe, more than 3,000 cases had
been reported; presumably these
started from MBM from the United
Kingdom, but recycling of infected
MBM also is likely to have been a prob-
lem within those European countries.
There also had been a small number of
cases in non-European countries;
these involved imported animals. 
One reason it was difficult to under-
stand—and therefore control—BSE
more quickly is that the disease has a
long incubation period; it takes four
to six years before infected cattle
show symptoms. Most have been
slaughtered before then. For a long
time, it was mistakenly believed that
animals not showing symptoms could
not infect others. Indeed, confidence
that beef was safe to eat meant that
for some time even animals slaugh-
tered because they were showing
symptoms were used for human food.
The incubation period in humans may
be ten or more years.
With increased knowledge of BSE,
including its probable transmission to
humans, a complete ban was imposed
in the United Kingdom in March
1996 on use of all mammalian MBM
in farm animal feed. Even this ban
could be described as conservative,
and indeed there is a lack of clarity on
exactly what has been banned.
Phillips, Bridgeman, and Ferguson-
Smith (2000) get it wrong in their
summary (vol. 1, 66):
[Previous measures] were re-
placed after 20 March 1996 by
the radical step of banning the in-
corporation of all animal protein
in animal feed.
Phillips, Bridgeman, and Ferguson-
Smith are suggesting that, despite all
that had happened up to that point,
the ban still seemed radical. That cer-
tainly is not true now, especially since
the ban includes not “all animal pro-
tein” but only mammalian MBM.
They make this clear elsewhere, but
this still leaves room for confusion. It
remains legal, for example, to feed
poultry protein to animals, including
poultry. Even as of 2002 a complete
ban on intra-species recycling was
only being considered, not pressed.
Whether or not the ban was radical
when it was introduced, MAFF resist-
ed it for a long time. It seems bizarre
now, but this resistance came in the
face of proposals from feed manufac-
turers, as represented by the U.K.
Agricultural Supply Trade Association
(UKASTA) (Phillips, Bridgeman, and
Ferguson-Smith 2000): 
MAFF was concerned not to do
anything that would lead UKASTA
members to cease using animal
protein as an ingredient of feed
for non-ruminant animals. UKAS-
TA, for its part, was anxious that
its members should be able to
continue to do this without incur-
ring risk of prosecution should it
result, on occasion, in cross-cont-
amination of ruminant feed.
UKASTA was to threaten repeat-
edly that it might have to advise
its members to cease using ani-
mal protein, while MAFF officials
sought to allay UKASTA’s anxi-
eties. (vol. 1, 63)
No cases of BSE had been diag-
nosed in the United States as of mid-
2003. Importation of ruminants and
ruminant by-products from countries
with BSE have been banned for some
years, and in 1997 the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration banned the use
of mammalian carcasses in the pro-
duction of feed for ruminants. A study
commissioned by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture concluded that
risk of BSE in the United States is low
(Harvard Center for Risk Analysis
2001), but some commentators ar-
gue that there is much too little sur-
veillance, especially as compliance
with feed rules is known to be weak
(Newman 2001).
At the height of the BSE epidemic
there were at least four serious public
concerns in addition to the obvious
worries about possible effects on
human health and the farming indus-
try. First was a view that MAFF was
divided in its loyalties on the BSE
issue and could not be trusted to
defend consumers’ interests as well as
those of farmers. Second, there was a
perception that the government had
concealed the truth about the risk to
humans. Phillips, Bridgeman, and
Ferguson-Smith (2000) reject both of
these charges. Nevertheless, they
acknowledge (vol. 1, xviii) that “con-
fidence in government pronounce-
ments about risk was a further casu-
alty of BSE.” One consequence of this
(in combination with other crises,
particularly the outbreak of E. coli
discussed next) was the establish-
ment in 2000 of an independent Food
Standards Agency. Another was redis-
tribution of MAFF’s responsibilities
after the 2001 general election and
its replacement with a Department of
Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs.
The third public concern had to do
with the effects of the disease on the
cattle themselves. There has been
surprisingly little discussion of the
actual impact of BSE on cattle wel-
fare. However, Phillips, Bridgeman,
and Ferguson-Smith (2000) make it
clear that vCJD is very unpleasant for
humans (Table 1), and it may be pre-
sumed that BSE in cows has at least
some similar mental as well as physi-
cal effects. Furthermore, media cov-
erage suggested that concern for the
animals involved was not limited to
considerations of suffering. It also
expressed that it is wrong for animals
to have a disease, especially one seen
as avoidable, irrespective of its men-
tal effects, and that killing of animals
(including healthy herd mates of cows
with BSE) is of serious ethical con-
cern. The concern about killing may
be based in part on the fact that the
animals are not being used for meat
or other purposes. It also is possible
that the concern simply came to the
fore because the killing was brought
to public attention. These ideas will
be discussed again below, in the con-
text of foot and mouth disease. 
The fourth and most fundamental
concern was that the whole process of
forcing herbivores to eat animal pro-
tein, of making cows into cannibals,
was an unnatural practice. This may
be partly a concern for the cows, part-
ly a feeling that treating animals
unnaturally is wrong in itself, and
partly an opinion that it should have
been obvious that such a practice
would lead to disaster. Phillips,
Bridgeman, and Ferguson-Smith
(2000) reject this last point:
The practice of feeding MBM to
animals in the United Kingdom
dates back at least to 1926. . . . It
is a practice which has also been
followed in many other countries.
It was recognised that it was
important that the rendering
process should inactivate conven-
tional pathogens. Experience had
not suggested that the practice
involved any other risks. In these
circumstances we can understand
why no one foresaw that the prac-
tice of feeding ruminant protein
to ruminants might give rise to a
disaster such as the BSE epidem-
ic. (vol. 1, 20)
If producers were going to give cat-
tle supplementary protein to boost
their productivity, then perhaps it was
not unreasonable for them to use ani-
mal protein that was readily available
and had the right mix of nutrients.
However, the practice now can be
seen to be part of a general approach
to animal agriculture, common par-
ticularly in the second half of the
twentieth century, that pushed for
increased production at decreased
cost with scant regard for the animals
concerned. It now is well recognized
that dairy cows are under huge meta-
bolic stress to maintain their greatly
increased milk production, with many
effects on welfare such as negative
energy balance and lameness (Web-
ster 1994). In developed countries
most people do not need milk to be as
cheap as it currently is, so that less
economy-oriented dairy systems—
those that do not use protein supple-
mentation—could be adopted. 
The most important question now
is not whether the practice of feeding
cattle protein to cattle was culpable,
but how to adapt agriculture to
reduce the chance of similar disasters
in future—disasters that are perhaps
intrinsically unforeseeable. An impor-
tant part of the answer must be to
reduce the emphasis on cheap pro-
duction and to take into account the
evolutionary history and biology of
the animals involved—in other words,
to treat the animals more naturally.
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Table 1
Symptoms of vCJD in Humans 
An early age of onset or death (average 27.6 years, range 18–41 years).
A prolonged duration of illness (average 13.1 months, range 7.5–24 months).
A predominantly psychiatric presentation including anxiety, depression, 
withdrawal, and progressive behavioral changes.
First evidence of neurological involvement in four patients was dysaesthesiae
(unpleasant abnormal sensations) in the limbs and/or face.
Development of a cerebellar syndrome, with problems with gait 
and limb muscle coordination after a period of weeks or months.
Development of forgetfulness and memory disturbance, often late in the clinical
course, which progressed to severe cognitive impairment and a state of akinetic
mutism (paralysis and inability to speak) in the majority of cases.
Development of muscle twitching or spasms in the majority of patients 
(myoclonus), preceded by purposeless involuntary movements in some 
(chorea), with EEG appearances typical of sporadic CJD absent.
Source: Phillips, Bridgeman, and Ferguson-Smith 2000, 8:2 
Escherischia
coli O157
Many strains of the bacterium
Escherischia coli (E. coli) live harm-
lessly in the guts of humans and ani-
mals. One of the exceptions is E. coli
O157, a virulent, toxin-producing
strain first identified as causing hu-
man illness in 1982. Infection is fre-
quent; for example, there are an esti-
mated 73,000 cases of infection and
61 associated deaths in the United
States each year (Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention 2001). The
main reservoir is in cattle and sheep,
for whom it causes no illness. The
main route of human infection proba-
bly is contamination of meat by ani-
mal feces. Heating of meat kills E.
coli, but only if it is thorough. People
also can be infected directly by live
animals and each other—for example,
in nursing homes where hygiene is
poor.
An outbreak of E. coli food poison-
ing in central Scotland in 1996 affect-
ed about 500 people, 18 of whom died
(Pennington Group 1997; most of
this account depends on this report,
supplemented by Pennington 1999).
This was the world’s second highest
number of deaths from such an out-
break. 
Events moved with impressive
speed (Table 2). A likely outbreak was
identified on Friday, November 22,
1996, with fifteen confirmed or sus-
pected cases. By that evening it was
known that at least eight had eaten
food from John Barr’s butcher shop
in Wishaw (although that did not
prove it was the source) and health
officials visited the premises. On Sat-
urday, November 23, an outbreak-
control team was formed, chaired by
a local health board consultant. On
Wednesday, November 27, Barr’s
closed. On Thursday an inquiry was
announced in Parliament, chaired by
Professor Hugh Pennington of Aber-
deen University.
Barr’s shop was indeed the source.
He had supplied contaminated food
to many private customers and sever-
al institutions and groups. These
included the three clusters worst
affected. Eight people who died had
been at a church lunch in Wishaw on
Sunday, November 17; six who died
were at a nursing home in Bonny-
bridge (all whom were aged 69 or
older); and a number of non-fatal
cases had followed a birthday party on
Saturday, November 23. Some cases
resulted from sales Barr made from
the back door of the shop after it was
shut on November 27. 
The main problem was that Barr
and his staff did not keep raw and
cooked meat properly separated. This
was exacerbated by a general lack of
proper hygiene in the handling and
preparation of food. When contami-
nated raw meat came in, the contam-
ination spread to cooked meat, which
customers did not heat enough to
make safe. Thus the contamination
got progressively worse rather than
being eliminated. In January 1998
Barr’s company was fined for breach-
ing food hygiene regulations.
Because failure to follow regula-
tions contributed to this outbreak,
the Pennington Group (1997) empha-
sized the need to educate people on
the importance of such regulations,
and to improve enforcement of com-
pliance. But it also stressed the
importance of events all along the
way from cattle to table—on the
farm, during animal transport, at the
slaughterhouse, during meat trans-
port, in premises processing and sell-
ing food, and in the home. The report
recommended new regulations, bet-
ter education, and a general change
in attitude to improve hygiene.
Involvement of farms, slaughterhous-
es, and food distributors will be men-
tioned here. 
Farmers have a responsibility to send
animals to slaughter in clean con-
dition. This is affected by a number of
factors, such as whether they are given
clean, dry bedding and whether they
are crowded in holding yards (which
increases the likelihood that they will
soil each other (C.B. Tucker, Universi-
ty of British Columbia, personal com-
munication, June 30, 1999). The Pen-
nington Report also criticizes a
practice of “feeding up” cows before
slaughter to increase live weight and
hence the price obtained; feeding up
increases the chance of intestines
bursting during removal, and hence
contaminating carcasses. By contrast,
in instances where the same company
both owns and slaughters animals, it is
common for food to be withheld before
slaughter.
Slaughterhouses also must avoid
slaughtering dirty cattle, and must
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Table 2
Events in the 1996 Outbreak of E. coli
Food Poisoning in Central Scotland
Sunday, November 17 Wishaw Parish Church lunch
Friday, November 22 Likely outbreak identified 
Barr’s butcher shop visited by health officials
Saturday, November 23 Outbreak Control Team formed 
Birthday party at Cascade Public House, 
Wishaw
Wednesday, November 27 Barr’s closed
Thursday, November 28 Expert Group set up under 
Professor Pennington
Thursday, December 5 Fatal Accident Inquiry announced 
Tuesday, December 31 Pennington Group submitted interim report
March 1997 Report commissioned on setting up 
a Food Standards Agency
April 1997 Pennington Group submitted final report 
2000 Food Standards Agency established
improve various practices to safe-
guard hygiene. The Pennington
Group comments that: 
There clearly has to be a cultural
change amongst slaughterhouse
operators and their staff. . . .
Notwithstanding commercial con-
siderations and the implications
of, for example, piece rates of pay-
ment for workers [in which they
get paid for work done rather
than time worked], the speed of
the production process within
abattoirs needs to be controlled
so as to permit the achievement
of adequate food safety standards.
(1997, 19)
The report includes this statement
concerning food distributors:
The distribution chain of meat
and meat products from Barr’s
was diverse and complex and it
took some days for the details on
that to be unravelled from a
painstaking investigation of the
company’s records. That caused
delays in relation to the identifi-
cation, publicly, of some of the
outlets involved or potentially
involved in the outbreak. Some
85 outlets. . . were eventually
identified as being supplied by the
company, making the task of out-
break management and control
extremely difficult. (5) 
So, while response to the Barr’s
outbreak was rapid, it could have
been more rapid—and prevented
many cases—if it had not been for
this complexity of food distribution.
Around the time of this outbreak,
other food safety problems also were
publicized, including the danger of
Listeria in unpasteurized cheeses. As
a response to the accumulating list of
such problems, the United Kingdom’s
Labor Party commissioned a report in
March 1997 on the possibility of set-
ting up a food standards agency.
Labor won the general election that
May, formed the new government,
and, shortly thereafter, accepted the
report’s proposals. The Food Stan-




Classical swine fever (CSF), or hog
cholera, is one of the most important
virus diseases of pigs. It is a fast-
spreading disease, limited to pigs,
with high mortality. Outbreaks are
intermittent in Europe. There was a
major outbreak in the Netherlands in
1997, for example, and many, smaller
outbreaks in Germany (where it is
endemic in wild boar) from 1998 to
2000. North America is free of CSF.
A CSF outbreak in southeast Eng-
land started on August 8, 2000. On
August 14 movement restrictions
were imposed, which, over the next
four months, would affect 264 farms
suspected of disease and 907 more in
the infected areas. CSF was con-
firmed on sixteen farms; 41,000 pigs
were slaughtered on those and neigh-
boring farms as a direct result of the
outbreak and 34,000 more as “dan-
gerous contacts.” 
On December 30 (Anonymous
2001) the outbreak was confirmed to
be over, and movement restrictions
were lifted. While the outbreak was
confined and eliminated relatively
rapidly, it had a severe financial effect
on a pig industry that already was in
difficulties; many pig farmers left the
business. It is also noteworthy that
the outbreak was at its height when
the Phillips report on BSE was pub-
lished in October 2000.
The most likely source of disease is
thought to have been an infected
pork product, illegally imported, per-
haps dropped on the farm by a mem-
ber of the public or a wild animal
(Gibbens et al. 2000). Initial detec-
tion was slow, perhaps in part because
CSF’s symptoms are similar to those
of other, prevalent diseases. The dis-
ease probably was present in June, so
that movements of pigs to other
farms already had occurred before
CSF was identified (Sharpe et al.
2001). Subsequently there was some
spread between neighboring farms,
but no evidence of irresponsible
movements. By contrast, one of the
ways in which disease spread in the
Netherlands in 1997 was via trucks
moving between farms (Elbers et al.
1999). Another major problem in the
Netherlands was the concentration of
its industry, enabling the virus to
spread readily from house to house
and farm to farm.
In many ways, control of the U.K.
outbreak was a success story, and one
that must have influenced decisions
on handling foot and mouth disease,
which followed hot on its heels. How-
ever, it renewed concerns about vigi-
lance and effective surveillance for
diseases, and about general attitudes
regarding the importance of disease
control. (The United Kingdom’s state
veterinary service has been reduced
in size, and the number of veterinari-
ans working in large animal practices
has been declining (Anonymous
2000).) It also renewed concerns
about the killing of animals, many of
whom were found to have been
healthy. There is an effective vaccine
for CSF, but EU and U.K. policy is not
to use it on animals who have the dis-
ease, who are suspected of having it,
or who might become infected. This
is because vaccinated animals cannot
be distinguished from infected ani-
mals, so vaccination hinders eradica-
tion. An EU directive adopted in 2001
continued this policy but placed
increased emphasis on development
of “marker vaccines” that would allow




Foot and mouth disease (FMD)
appeared in northern England in Feb-
ruary 2001 and rapidly became an
epidemic. It broke out on a pig farm
and spread to neighboring sheep
farms. Sheep from this farm were
moved around the country before the
disease was diagnosed. Three days
after the diagnosis, the U.K. minister
for agriculture imposed a complete
ban on animal movements. By then,
however, the disease had been estab-
lished for several weeks; the Depart-
ment of Environment, Food, and
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Rural Affairs (DEFRA)—which
replaced MAFF in June 2001—esti-
mated that there had probably been
over 2 million movements of sheep in
that period. Many of these move-
ments were not recorded, as they
should have been. Furthermore, farm-
ers continued to move animals ille-
gally during the crisis (Lashmar
2001). Some of these movements
were for the animals’ sake—for exam-
ple, because they were in fields with
insufficient food—and the govern-
ment soon issued guidance and help
for such cases. However, some move-
ments must have been for commer-
cial reasons. Some animals were
moved abroad both before and after
the ban, and the disease spread to the
Netherlands, France, and Ireland. It
reached Ireland by an illegal move-
ment of animals across the border
from Northern Ireland.
This was the first outbreak in the
United Kingdom since 1967, apart
from a small outbreak on the Isle of
Wight, off the south coast, which
rapidly was controlled. The latter
demonstrated, though, just how
infective the disease is, as it was
caused by the virus blowing across
from France. DEFRA attributed the
decades-long period without infec-
tion, in a world with widespread FMD,
to tightened control of imports from
countries with the disease after 1967
and improved hygiene and animal
health standards. However, illegal
importation of meat is common, with
more than 200 consignments inter-
cepted on their way into the United
Kingdom every month and unknown
numbers missed. Some of these go to
restaurants, and waste food from a
restaurant was found at the pig farm
in question. Use of waste food for pigs
has been common, and although it is
supposed to be heated at 100°C for an
hour—which would kill the FMD
virus—this often does not happen
(Lashmar 2001). (Feeding of waste
food to pigs now is banned.) While
exactly what happened on this farm
has yet to be established, it seems
that the farmer failed to notice symp-
toms of FMD, although his pigs were
infected for several weeks before offi-
cials traced the source of the out-
break to his farm. 
So far, Australia, New Zealand, and
the United States have managed to
keep FMD out, presumably by more
rigorous import controls than are
achieved in Europe.
As with CSF, during the 2001 epi-
demic, the policy of the United King-
dom and the rest of the EU was to
slaughter animals with FMD, those
who might have it, and those who
risked spreading it. The main reason
was commercial: a country with
infected or vaccinated animals may
not export animals or meat to coun-
tries free of the disease. At the peak
of the epidemic, about fifty farms
where the disease was present were
identified daily. After about two
months, the number had dropped to
fewer than ten per day. The outbreak
had a long “tail,” with three or four
farms being infected per day before
the disease finally was eliminated late
in the year. More than 1,900 farms
were affected directly, and 7,000
neighboring farms also were cleared
of animals. About 4 million animals
were slaughtered.
The slaughter policy was hugely
controversial. This was largely a result
of the issue’s high profile, as televi-
sion broadcasts showed thousands of
farm animals being killed, many of
them healthy, and their carcasses
burned. Individual stories of pet ani-
mals and prime breeding herds
received considerable publicity. As
with BSE, even though the farm ani-
mals would eventually have been
killed anyway, the fact that they were
being prematurely and very visibly
killed was morally repugnant to many
people. The outrage probably was
exacerbated by the fact that, for
many, the killing was seen not to have
a useful purpose—such as meat pro-
duction—but to be done for defense
of a meat export trade that they
regarded as unnecessary. Indeed, loss-
es to the tourism industry, caused by
people being unable to move around
in the countryside, heavily out-
weighed the value of the meat
exports. Furthermore, suggestions
that the disease is not very severe if
left untreated gave rise to discussion
of whether it should be allowed to
continue rather than eradicated by
draconian measures. (In fact, symp-
toms of the disease vary in severity; it
sometimes causes considerable suf-
fering and in particular causes major
problems in breeding animals, such
as abortion and loss of milk produc-
tion, and mortality in the young.) On
balance, it seems appropriate to erad-
icate an eradicable disease. However,
even though FMD was eventually
eradicated, it might break out again
sooner or later. If that were to hap-
pen, the U.K. government says it
would employ vaccination rather than
extermination as its strategy in deal-
ing with the disease. (Countries in
which FMD is endemic use regular
vaccination and, as is the case for
CSF, development of marker vaccines
has been proposed.)
To re-emphasize the commercial
basis of the policy not to vaccinate,
the decision to end vaccination in the
EU in 1991 was taken on the basis
that a major outbreak every ten years
would be less costly than annual vac-
cination (Nettleton and Reid 2001).
There were reasons other than the
slaughter policy for controversy. It
was apparent that the United King-
dom was ill-prepared for the crisis.
The early slaughter and carcass dis-
posal were relatively slow, delaying
containment of the epidemic. In addi-
tion, the methods used for handling
and slaughtering animals evidently
were not as humane as they might
have been. Accusations also were
made against farmers. Some were
seen to be profiteering by pushing
claims for compensation higher than
reasonable, with the direct cost of
FMD reaching £1 billion by August.
There were suspicions that some
deliberately spread the infection to
their own animals to claim compen-
sation above market values (Hether-
ington and Lomax 2001). On the
other hand, many farmers were hurt
both emotionally and financially by
the crisis; a number even committed
suicide.
Apart from inquiries into the epi-
demic and its handling, the FMD cri-
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sis finally precipitated wide-ranging
discussion of the future of farm ani-
mal production in the United King-
dom. One result was establishment by
the government of a Policy Commis-
sion on the Future of Farming and
Food, which produced a report





One obvious question that arises from
this succession of crises is whether
the United Kingdom is doing some-
thing different from other countries,
something culpable. It is true that
agriculture is more industrialized in
the United Kingdom than in many
other European countries, with larger
farms and a smaller proportion of the
population involved. It also is true
that the drive for greater and cheaper
food production after World War II
was stronger in the United Kingdom
than elsewhere, arguably because the
United Kingdom is an island nation.
It is possible that these factors led to
widespread laxity in food handling,
which magnified the disease crises.
However, it also is apparent that the
United Kingdom is not the only coun-
try with such problems. Reprehensi-
ble actions occur elsewhere; for
example, in 1999 it became known
that human and animal feces were
being incorporated illegally into feed
for farm animals in France (Meade
1999). This practice was both repel-
lent and as risky as those that gave
rise to BSE. While the United King-
dom has been hit particularly hard by
farm animal diseases in recent years,
this must at least partly have been
bad luck. The lessons to be learned
are relevant to all countries.
Biosecurity 
When international travellers enter
the United States or New Zealand
they are asked whether they are
bringing in food and whether they
have visited farms or plan to do so.
While this is done with varying strin-
gency, it is strikingly different from
the lax approach used in other coun-
tries. Indeed, New Zealand is the only
country with a minister for agricul-
ture and biosecurity, and its Biosecu-
rity Authority produces a regular
magazine intended for the general
public as well as specialists. By con-
trast, although DEFRA launched a
biosecurity campaign in the United
Kingdom in June 2001, it was aimed
solely at farmers. 
Obviously, other countries should
adopt policies on biosecurity similar
to those of New Zealand. Given that
classical swine fever and FMD proba-
bly were introduced into the United
Kingdom by illegal imports, the fact
that the United States and New
Zealand have remained free of FMD
must partly be luck. However, strin-
gent regulations and stringent
enforcement of those regulations
must reduce the chance of disease
transmission. 
The United States and New Zealand
are not blame-free: they are guilty of
double standards in restricting
imports while aggressively exporting
agricultural products. So long as
these export policies continue, the
two countries risk exporting any dis-
ease that does get into their animals
or animal products in the future.
They also reinforce the tendency to
regard such exportation as routine,
acceptable, and inevitable. In fact, on
the contrary, it is evident that inter-
national movement of animal feed,
animals, and food from animals is
dangerous, largely unnecessary and
damaging to animal welfare and the
environment (Lucas 2001). Ways
must be found of reducing such
movement.
Similarly, movement of animal
feed, animals, and food from animals
within countries must be reduced. A
major factor in the foot and mouth
epidemic was the enormous scale of
sheep movements. Animals often are
driven very long distances to slaugh-
terhouses, for instance, frequently
passing by nearer slaughterhouses on
the way. For biosecurity and animal
welfare, animals should be slaugh-
tered at facilities as close as possible
to the farm where they are produced;
yet the number of slaughterhouses in
the United Kingdom has declined
considerably over recent years. Local
food production and consumption
clearly are desirable for animal
health—and many other reasons
(Valen 2001). Traceability—the prin-
ciple that it should be possible to
track any product “from farm to fork”
or vice versa—also is gaining impor-
tance, with obvious relevance to ani-
mal health and food safety.
Biosecurity frequently has been
regarded with complacency. It is
imperative that vigilance become the
norm, with systems in place in the
food industry that lead to contain-
ment or prevention of disease. 
In the United States, such vigilance
has been discussed much more since
the events of September 2001 raised
the possibility that disease outbreaks
might be introduced purposefully. It
is striking that little of that discus-
sion has addressed the fundamental
structure of the U.S. agricultural
industry, despite the prominent role
such structure was seen to have had
in causing the crises in the United
Kingdom—and the fact that the agri-
cultural industry in the United States
is much more concentrated and more
intensive than that of the United
Kingdom, and that there is much
more movement in the United States
of animal feed, animals, and food
from animals. The future is difficult
to predict, but it does seem extreme-
ly likely that if there is a serious out-
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break of a disease such as FMD in the
United States—whether accidental or
deliberate—it could rapidly become
very serious, indeed. These issues
would then be given the attention
they deserve. What seems surprising,
especially as salmonellosis and E. coli
infection already are widespread, is
that such attention isn’t already
forthcoming. It would obviously be
better to address these issues proper-
ly before such an outbreak—reducing





Biosecurity will not come cheap.
However, it is increasingly apparent
that pressure for cheap food has
incurred many external costs, that
“cheap food at any price” is not a sus-
tainable policy, and that cost-cutting
elsewhere (such as in veterinary sur-
veillance) also has been damaging. As
the Pennington Group (1997) empha-
sized in relation to E. coli, disease
control includes events on the farm,
during animal transport, at the
slaughterhouse, during transport of
meat, in premises processing and sell-
ing food, and in the home—and sup-
ply of animal feed should be added to
the beginning of that sequence.
Improvement of disease control at all
those stages will require expenditure.
How is it to be paid for? One mecha-
nism might be a levy on food from
animals, to be spent on improving
animal health and welfare. As the cost
of animal products in a meal usually
accounts for only a small proportion
of its selling price, most consumers
would hardly notice such a change.
Cheap food production has not gen-
erally increased profits of farmers,
because profits constantly are pared
away by price competition. Income
for many farmers is low and unreli-
able, which must affect their attitude
to and limit their spending on animal
health and welfare. A decent, reliable
income for farmers—not huge
wealth, but a reasonable living—must
be part of a sustainable future for
farming. 
On the farm, relevant issues
include:
• Group size: Maintaining smaller
groups of animals restricts dis-
ease transmission.
• Housing conditions: Giving ani-
mals sufficient space and clean,
dry conditions, including bed-
ding, increases their health and
cleanliness. Hygiene is not
increased by barren conditions. 
• Feeding methods: These are criti-
cal and have many effects on
health and welfare. Considera-
tion must be given to the biology
of the animals involved, that is, to
treating the animals as naturally
as possible.
• Concentration of animals: Large,
closely spaced units increase dis-
ease transmission. Small, well-
spaced houses and farms should
be favored.
Consideration also should be given
to licensing farms or farmers. Most
farmers are not criminal or irrespon-
sible, but it should be possible to
exclude the minority who are.
Minor increases in expenditure on
food and on other aspects of biosecu-
rity related to food production could
produce major improvements in farm
animal health and welfare. Mecha-
nisms should be explored to achieve
these changes.
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